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Law Firms, Ethics, 
and Equity Capital:  
A Conversation 
   
About the Center 
 
 The Center for the Study of the Legal Profession at Georgetown University Law Center is 
devoted to promoting interdisciplinary scholarship on the profession informed by awareness of 
the dynamics of modern practice; providing students with a sophisticated understanding of the 
opportunities and challenges of a modern legal career; and furnishing members of the bar, 
particularly those in organizational decision-making positions, broad perspectives on trends and 
developments in practice. 
 
 In support of its mission, the Center sponsors symposia, research, publications, 
workshops, and speakers designed to foster exchanges among scholars, practitioners, and 
students about the ongoing evolution of law practice and the aims and commitments of the 
profession.  The Co-Directors of the Center are Professor Mitt Regan, 
regan@law.georgetown.edu, and Professor Jeffrey Bauman, bauman@law.georgetown.edu.  
For more information on the Center, go to http://www.law.georgetown.edu/legalprofession/. 
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Introduction 
 
 The correspondence collected here represents an effort to start a conversation.  Pending 
legislation in the United Kingdom, based on what is known as the Clementi Report, would 
permit non-lawyer equity investment in law firms, subject to regulatory oversight. See 
http://www.dca.gov.uk/legist/legalservices.htm.  In other words, UK law firms could become 
publicly-traded businesses. This legislation has been proposed as part of reforms heralded as 
improving the delivery of legal services to consumers.  By contrast, such investment in law firms 
is forbidden by ethical rules in the United States.  What will happen when the two countries 
with the most dominant global law firms begin to move along such different paths? 
 
 Australia already allows such investment, but the prospect of major UK firms raising 
capital in the equity markets has the potential to produce seismic shifts in the global market for 
legal services.  It also could have far-reaching implications for the legal profession that we can 
only dimly anticipate.  Until now, there has been remarkably little discussion – especially in the 
United States -- about the possible effects of the UK legislation.   
 
 This paper attempts to redress that situation.  It consists of an exchange among Bruce 
MacEwen, an expert on law firm economics and editor of the on-line publication Adam Smith, 
Esq.; Mitt Regan, a Professor at Georgetown University Law Center, an expert on the legal 
profession; and Larry Ribstein, a Professor at the University of Illinois College of Law, an expert 
on partnership law.  Mr. MacEwen can be contacted at bruce@adamsmithesq.com, and at the 
Adam Smith website at www.AdamSmithEsq.com/blog.  Professor Ribstein can be contacted at 
ribstein@law.uiuc.edu, and at his website http://ideoblog.org/.   
 
 Appreciation of how profoundly the legal profession has changed in the past generation 
is useful as background.  Law firms in particular have felt the brunt of a transformation in which 
they now must compete more fiercely than ever both for clients and for lawyers.  As a result, 
firms increasingly have taken on the characteristics of more conventional business enterprises.  
They pay close attention to the financial performance of both the firm and its individual lawyers.  
Information about a firm’s financial condition is now widely available and can prompt dramatic 
reorganizations, including layoffs and reductions in compensation for lawyers. 
 
 Firms have grown substantially, with many containing over a thousand lawyers.  They 
have opened multiple offices in the United States and abroad.  Most large firms employ a cadre 
of non-lawyer professionals in executive and managerial positions, and vigorously market their 
services.  An increasing number now employ general counsel to represent the firm in various 
matters.  Most firms now are limited liability entities, and some have adopted the corporate 
form.   In these and other respects, law firms have come more closely to resemble their 
corporate clients.  
 
 Some lament these changes as marking the loss of professional identity, while others 
applaud them as overdue measures that overturn a guild system and make the provision of 
legal services more efficient and responsive to clients.  Until recently, however, there has been 
one feature of business enterprise that has been strictly off-limits for law firms: equity 
ownership by non-lawyers.  While corporations are able to raise capital by selling shares to the 
public, ethics rules have forbidden lawyers from practicing in any organization in which a non-
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lawyer holds an ownership interest.  The rationale for this has been that such ownership risks 
lay interference with lawyers’ professional judgment. 
 
 The discussion contained in the following pages begins with an inquiry by Bruce 
MacEwen into whether current United States ethical rules would permit law firms to issue a 
financial instrument whose value is tied to the financial performance of the firm.  The rule 
potentially most directly applicable is American Bar Association Model Rule 5.4, which provides 
that a lawyer “shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corporation or association 
authorized to practice law for a profit if . . . a nonlawyer owns any interest therein.”  Mr. 
MacEwen poses several questions.  Could the financial instrument he describes be issued to 
lawyers in a firm?  To non-lawyers? Could it be sold to persons outside the firm and be publicly 
traded?  Would it represent an interest in the firm – thus forbidden by Rule 5.4 – or an interest 
only in a derivative issued by the firm? 
 
 The discussion continues with a response from Mitt Regan.  Professor Regan analyzes 
the application of Rule 5.4 to a financial instrument with various characteristics.  He then moves 
to a discussion of the underlying concerns of that Rule, the changes in law firms that might 
occur as a result of issuing a publicly traded derivative, and the extent to which these changes 
might implicate the values that animate Rule 5.4.  He suggests that the ability to sell such a 
derivative could produce some salutary changes in law firms.  He also asks, however, whether 
the prospect that lawyers would “practice to the share price” could have an undesirable effect 
on lawyers’ roles as client representatives and as stewards of the legal system.   
 
 Professor Larry Ribstein then joins the conversation by offering short comments that 
serve as a prelude to his later correspondence.  He acknowledges the concerns that Professor 
Regan raises, but questions whether regulating the structure of law firms, rather than their 
behavior, is the best way to address them.  Furthermore, he suggests, the dynamics of the 
market may serve as an additional influence that leads lawyers to attend to their 
responsibilities. 
 
 Mr. MacEwen replies to Professor Regan, and briefly to Professor Ribstein, by suggesting 
that the experience of other professional service firms—such as in the financial services industry 
-- indicates that public ownership can create incentives for both innovation and efficiency in the 
provision of services.  In particular, firms would have reason to invest more in organizational 
capital that would contribute to stable long-term financial performance.  Far from representing 
the abandonment of professionalism, he maintains, the adoption of this strategy could provide 
the financial foundation necessary for the realization of professional values. 
 
 Professor Ribstein then extends the discussion by focusing in more detail on the 
prospect of publicly-owned law firms.  He analyzes the possible impact on lawyers’ ability to 
satisfy their obligations both to clients and to sustaining legal institutions.  He concludes that 
firms with outside investors could meet both these obligations while operating more efficiently.  
In particular, equity ownership could enhance incentives for lawyers to behave in ways that 
promote the collective interests of the firm, rather than their own separate individual interests.  
To the extent that we are concerned that lawyers may not be sufficiently attentive to their role 
of preserving the social capital represented by the legal system, we should regulate lawyer 
behavior rather than law firm structure.  At a minimum, he suggests, firms should be free to 
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choose among various organizational structures that states might want to make available, free 
of impediments imposed by uniform state professional rules. 
 
 Mr. MacEwen concludes the exchange by suggesting that eliminating restrictions on law 
firm structure could unleash Schumpeter’s “creative destruction” in the market for legal 
services. This could give rise in particular to multi-disciplinary firms that offer a range of both 
legal and non-legal services.  Ultimately, he questions whether the ethical rules that prevent 
such a development serve the purposes that are invoked on their behalf.   
 
 The ideas expressed in this exchange are not the final word on the subject.  Indeed, 
they are meant to be exactly the opposite: an initial foray into new territory whose features 
can’t all be foreseen.  Ready or not, lawyers and the public are facing developments that raise 
profound questions about the identity and commitments of the profession.  Navigating these 
developments will require an open mind, deep reflection, and the capacity to imagine 
alternative worlds.  We invite you to buckle up and begin the journey.  
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Adam Smith, Esq. 
305 West 98th Street 
(#4C-S) 
New York, NY 10025 
March 26, 2007 
 
 
 
Prof. Milton Regan 
Georgetown University Law Center 
600 New Jersey Avenue NW 
Washington, DC  20001-2075 
Via email: regan@law.georgetown.edu 
 
Re:  Law Firms & Capital Markets Access 
 
Dear Mitt: 
 
 I’d like to solicit your thoughts on a concept I’ve been turning over in my mind for some 
time, and I’d actually like to enlist your help in the project, to the extent you’re interested, 
going forward. 
 
 Here’s the  problem:  While lawyers can and certainly do earn very handsome incomes 
as senior partners in AmLaw 100 firms, they have no material wealth-creation opportunities.  
No stock options, no routine opportunity to invest in deals (setting aside the brief dot-com 
bubble when firms, if not individual lawyers, took equity in startups in lieu of cash fees, an 
experience whose end-game means it will probably not be readily embraced again soon), no 
supranormal income windfalls such as investment bankers experience with bonuses, which can 
be invested long-term for meaningful wealth creation. 
 
 This state of affairs leaves law firms at a competitive disadvantage when it comes to 
recruiting and retaining talent.   
 
• Associates can be lured by investment banks, management consulting, and even plain 
old corporate clients with stock options on attractive growth trajectories. 
• Partners as well can be lured to private equity or hedge funds, or in-house to quality law 
departments (GE’s being the poster child), again with stock options on the table. 
• “C-suite” executives in law firms cannot be compensated at levels equivalent to their 
peers at similarly-sized corporations. 
• Last and most obvious, ordinary income receives the most onerous tax treatment of all 
forms of potential compensation. 
 
 On a more personal level, I’ve spoken with several managing partners of major firms 
who have seen their firms’ gross annual revenues double, quadruple, or more during their 
tenures, and who are understandably exasperated that they have no way of personally 
benefiting from what would be the handsome performance of the law firm’s “stock” in a way 
that any corporate CEO would as a matter of routine.  Adding insult to injury, these people also 
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have to keep very substantial amounts of personal capital locked up inside the firm, often 
earning sub-market or even zero interest. 
 
 My thoughts have also been informed by speculation on what the coming Clementi 
reforms might mean in the UK. 
 
 So this is the key question on which I seek your input, both as a corporate lawyer and a 
legal ethics luminary:   
 
Could law firms, consonant with ethical rules, create a derivative financial instrument, 
tradable as if it were a stock, engineered to reflect the implicit value of the firm? 
 
And, could this financial instrument be sold to and bought by: 
 
• Lawyers within the firm (whether or not partners); 
• C-suite executives and other non-lawyers at the firm; 
• Outside investors, presumably “accredited,” such as private equity funds? 
 
 I don’t want to go into the financial engineering behind designing such a derivative, 
other than to say there are people who spend their lives creating just such creatures:  Let’s 
assume for the nonce that it could be suitably crafted. 
 
 My real question for you is how this would fit within current ethical rules.  I assume the 
pertinent part of the ABA’s Model Rules is §5.4, and specifically: 
 
(b) A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the 
partnership consist of the practice of law. 
 
(c) […] 
 
(d) A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corporation or 
association authorized to practice law for a profit, if: 
(1) a nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary representative of the 
estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest of the lawyer for a reasonable time 
during administration; 
(2) a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof or occupies the position of 
similar responsibility in any form of association other than a corporation ; or 
(3) a nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judgment of a lawyer. 
 
 I don’t know the interpretive rulings, if any, under this proviso, and I certainly am not in 
a position to predict how the ABA or other regulatory authorities might react if the concept I 
have in mind were launched, but on the face of it I don’t see how my proposal violates §5.4: 
 
• 5.4(b) is not remotely what I’m proposing 
• 5.4(d)(1) is a closer call, but I still think that what I’m proposing would give the non-
lawyer an ownership interest in a derivative security, not the firm itself 
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• 5.4(d)(2) & (3) are also beside the point of what I’m proposing:  The nonlawyers would 
be passive owners of the security, akin to limited partners (or garden variety public 
company shareholders) with no colorable voice in management. 
 
 Aside from trying to interpret the literal language of §5.4 to permit us to get where we 
want to go, I honestly believe the more fundamental principle that §5.4 is attempting to 
uphold—that lawyers’ professional judgment should not be compromised by pressures to serve 
the financial interests of others—is not impaired in the slightest by my proposal.  You know as 
well as I that the fastest way to drive clients away from a firm is for its lawyers to be visibly 
serving interests other than their client’s, and I don’t personally know a single professional who 
would countenance that, as a matter of personal and professional integrity. 
 
 So:  What are your thoughts?  If other people have tried to plow this field before me 
without success, I’m unaware of it.  Sometimes it’s only by questioning very bedrock 
assumptions that one gets anywhere.   
 
 I look forward to discussing this. 
 
        Best regards, 
 
         
        Bruce MacEwen 
 
 
 
 PS:  The proposed Blackrock IPO has a fascinating structure that might provide 
guidance on how this hypothetical security could be constructed.  As you may know, Blackstone 
itself is the general partner in various investment funds, but that general partner is itself a 
limited partnership, and it’s the limited partnership that is going public—as a partnership, not a 
corporation, thus avoiding (among other things) the NYSE’s listing requirement that 
corporations have a majority of independent directors.   
 
 I’m not proposing that law firms go public—let them experiment with that in the UK first 
and we’ll learn how to avoid train wrecks over here—but the point is creative deal engineering 
can be done. 
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Georgetown University Law Center 
600 New Jersey Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20001 
March 31, 2007 
 
 
Dear Bruce: 
 
 Thanks for sharing your idea about the possibility of law firms creating a derivative 
instrument structured to reflect the implicit value of the firm.  The idea not only raises a 
question about the application of ABA Model Rule 5.4, but also necessarily prompts 
reexamination of broader assumptions about the modern large law firm, the nature of 
professional obligations, and the complex interaction between lawyer regulation and the legal 
services market.  In what follows, I’ll begin with an analysis of Rule 5.4, but that analysis 
quickly will lead to a discussion of these larger issues. 
 
 You ask: “Could law firms, consonant with ethical rules, create a derivative financial 
instrument engineered to reflect the implicit value of the firm as if it were tradable as a stock?”  
Could a firm sell this derivative to: (1) lawyers within the firm, both partners and non-partners; 
(2) high-level executives and other non-lawyers in the firm; and (3) outside investors, perhaps 
“accredited,” such as private equity funds.  I’ll focus first on two groups at the end of the 
spectrum – lawyers in the firm and outside investors – because I’m most confident about the 
likely interpretation of Rule 5.4 as applied to them, and because the likely contrast in the 
treatment of these groups will highlight the underlying conceptual issues.  I’ll then conclude 
with a short discussion of the application of the rule to non-lawyer executives and employees. 
 
Sale of Derivative to Lawyers in the Firm 
 
 The easiest issue is the availability of a derivative to lawyers within the firm.  This would 
neither violate Rule 5.4(a)’s prohibition on sharing legal fees with nonlawyers, nor Rule 5.4(d)’s 
proscription on lawyers practicing in an organization that practices law if a “nonlawyer owns any 
interest therein.”  More generally, it would not implicate the concern that is the rationale for the 
Rule.  That concern is that a lawyer’s professional judgment may be influenced by non-lawyers 
with a financial stake in the lawyer’s representation of a client.  Such parties are not subject to 
the ethical obligations with which lawyers must comply, and ostensibly may attempt to place 
pressure on a lawyer to maximize financial return at the expense of compliance with the 
lawyer’s professional duties.  
 
 The type of financial instrument you describe would seem comparable to existing 
compensation schemes that are based on the financial performance both of the firm and of 
individual lawyers.  It’s beyond my capacity to engage in complex valuation analysis, but I 
assume that the derivative would differ from the existing partnership draw system in that it 
would incorporate capitalized future earnings rather than simply annual revenue.  As such, it 
would reflect an assessment of the likely contribution of the firm’s organizational capital – 
systems, procedures, various forms of support and coordination – to the firm’s profitability in 
the foreseeable term.  In this respect, the revenue potential of the firm would be more than 
simply the sum of the earnings of the individual lawyers in the firm.   
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 In any event, the important point is that the derivative would not inject the specter of 
non-lawyer influence on lawyers’ professional judgment, and would be similar to current 
compensation approaches that are designed to create incentives for individual lawyers to 
maximize financial performance.  Indeed, there is an argument that this type of financial 
instrument might align the individual lawyer’s incentives more closely with the success of the 
firm as a whole, and perhaps somewhat less with simply the individual’s profitability.  More on 
that in a bit. 
 
Sale of Derivative to Outside Investors 
 
 Let’s move now to the application of Rule 5.4 to outside investors.  The most pertinent 
portion of the Rule is likely 5.4(d)(1), which says that a lawyer may not practice in any 
organization that practices law if “a nonlawyer owns any interest therein[.]”   One can argue 
that this provision does not apply, because the owner of a derivative would own not an interest 
in the firm, but in a security that has been issued by the firm.  Furthermore, the argument 
would go, simply holding a derivative as a passive investor would not create the risk of 
nonlawyer interference with lawyers’ judgment that animates the prohibition on fee-sharing in 
Rule 5.4(a), or on nonlawyers assuming positions of influence in a law practice under Rule 
5.4(d)(2) and (3). 
 
 This is a plausible interpretation, but I suspect that a state bar is unlikely to accept it.  
My guess is that a bar would maintain that Rule 5.4(d)(1) is intended to prohibit any nonlawyer 
from acquiring a financial interest whose value is dependent on law firm financial performance.  
A derivative instrument, the argument would go, by definition represents such an interest. 
 
 One response to this might be that the underlying concern of Rule 5.4(d)(1) is the 
exercise of investor influence on lawyer judgment.  Those who would hold derivative 
instruments, however, would be passive investors, with no voice in the operation of the firm.  
Indeed, getting a bit ahead of myself, law firms could issue publicly-traded shares with no 
voting rights, which arguably also would not raise the concern that animates the Rule.  This 
suggests, perhaps ironically to some, that a publicly-traded law firm would be less problematic 
than one owned by private equity, since equity funds tend to want an active role in exerting 
influence over the companies in which they invest.  
 
 I suspect, however, that a state bar would not accept this argument.  Analyzing why not 
requires that we address a more fundamental issue: what, if anything, is problematic about 
passive nonlawyer investment in a law firm?     
  
 If the holder of the financial instrument can exert no meaningful direct influence over 
how the firm is run, why should we prevent firms from gaining access to this source of capital?  
The response is likely to be that we don’t want lawyers “practicing to the share price” – i.e., 
making decisions in their representation that are driven mainly by a desire to maintain the value 
of the derivative.  As we’ve seen in the corporate sector, shareholders typically have little actual 
influence over managerial decisions, but many claim that managers have become obsessed with 
share price to the detriment of the corporation.  The risk is that this public metric or scorecard 
itself, not those who hold the instrument, may distort judgment.  
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Agency Costs 
 
 What are the specific risks to which a critic of outside investment might point?  One, 
which has tended to generate the most discussion, is that lawyers’ financial self-interest in 
keeping share price (or its equivalent) high will tempt them to place their own welfare above 
that of their clients when the two collide.  This would violate the lawyer’s duty as a fiduciary to 
subordinate her interests to those of the client.  This argument is based on the familiar concern 
about agency costs – what is the likelihood that any given variable will increase the probability 
that an agent will be faithless to her principal? 
 
 One question is whether the presence of passive investors would increase this risk 
beyond what already exists because of the financial performance pressures that law firms 
currently face.  This is a crucial issue, which I’ll defer for the moment and discuss at length 
below.  Perhaps the most common rejoinder to the agency costs argument, however, is that 
lawyers who placed their own interests above those of their clients would soon be penalized by 
a competitive legal services market.  Firms that acquired a reputation for such self-serving 
behavior would soon find their revenues fall and the value of their derivative drop accordingly.  
Breaching their fiduciary duty, in other words, would be a self-destructive move.  Indeed, the 
argument goes, the desire to keep the derivative value high would lead firms to exert even 
more effort on behalf of firms because keeping the customers happy is the true path to financial 
success. 
 
 I will ignore the more complicated reality that this straightforward theory elides, and 
what I take to be mixed experience with other types of professional service firms who have 
raised capital by going to the equity markets.  Laura Empson’s research sheds some light on 
this experience.  The argument that the market will limit agency costs certainly has some force, 
but even if we accept it without reservation there is a second concern that is distinctive to the 
legal profession.   
 
 Law as a Public Good 
 
 This is that lawyers produce a distinctive kind of product: law.  It is by now a 
commonplace observation that lawyers help make “law” in their work at least as much as 
legislatures and courts do.  As the legal realists forcefully reminded us, the latter promulgate 
the “law on the books,” but lawyers shape the “law in action.”  This is perhaps most obvious in 
litigation, where the arguments that lawyers advance often become precedent that regulates 
other parties in the future.  It’s also true in work such as regulatory counseling, when lawyers 
offer advice on how far to push the envelope that may formally or informally create the 
boundaries within which legitimate activity can occur, and transactional work, where lawyers 
devise novel legal forms that can become part of the accepted repertoire of private 
arrangements that the law will honor.  Each representation, even if only incrementally, thus 
produces externalities; every lawyer simultaneously is engaged in production of both private 
and public goods.   
 
 Of course, we have come to appreciate that most major economic organizations in 
modern society affect a variety of stakeholders.  Corporate managers increasingly are asked by 
the social responsibility movement to internalize more of the externalities that they generate.  
Shareholders are but one of the constituencies whose interests they must balance.  The point, 
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however, is that the externalities that lawyers produce affect the very basis of social order in a 
democracy.  The rule of law constitutes the understandings that people have about the scope 
and limits of proper behavior and, even more broadly, the willingness to abide by those limits 
rather than pursue unconstrained self-interest.  As the experience of developing countries and 
many Eastern European countries reflects, this is a form of social capital that is critical to belief 
in the basic legitimacy of the social order.  It’s not something that can be imposed from the top; 
it emerges instead from everyday experiences that affect perceptions of the extent to which the 
legal system embodies justice.  One of the concerns with abusive tax shelters, for instance, is 
that their proliferation may decrease the perceived legitimacy of the tax system, a serious 
problem for a system that relies mostly on voluntary compliance in order to function. 
 
 The role of the lawyer in producing this public good is captured metaphorically (and 
literally in the litigation context) by the idea that a lawyer not only is a private agent but an 
“officer of the court” – someone who has at least some obligation to preserve the viability of 
the legal system itself.   The bar commonly invokes this role in debates over privilege and 
confidentiality in the corporate setting.  If communications between lawyers and their corporate 
clients are not assiduously protected from disclosure, the bar argues, lawyers will be less 
effective in ensuring that corporations act legally and responsibly.  Clients will be less likely to 
include lawyers in the information loop if they fear that what they tell them will become public, 
and those conversations that do occur will be less candid.   Regardless of the accuracy of this 
claim, the point is that it’s premised on the notion that the lawyer is not simply an agent 
obligated to carry out the client’s wishes, but is someone who acts as an informal regulator of 
the client’s conduct.  The post-Enron SEC rules governing securities lawyers and the revision of 
ABA Model Rule 1.13 also reflect the notion that the lawyer has at least some gatekeeping 
responsibility with respect to client conduct. 
 
 One concern about “practicing to the share price” therefore is that lawyers may identify 
too closely with client interests and will be less willing to place limits on their pursuit.  That is, 
the problem may be precisely that the market will be too effective in aligning lawyers with 
clients, since that’s the path to profitability and a high share price.  Playing the role of steward 
of the legal system may not be financially rewarding, and may in fact be financially 
counterproductive, in a competitive market for legal services.  Lawyers may have little incentive 
to attend to the quality of the public good that they produce in every representation; after all, 
no one will be compensating them on behalf of society as a whole. 
 
 Appreciating this dimension of the lawyer’s work doesn’t automatically mean that we 
should reject the idea of the type of derivative instrument that you describe, or even publicly 
traded law firm shares.  It simply puts another consideration on the table that we need to take 
into account.  The question then becomes: what would be the impact of such reforms on 
lawyers’ ability and willingness both to place clients’ interests above financial self-interest, and 
to ensure that client conduct does not undermine the social capital embodied in the legal 
system?  Expressed even more pointedly: would the existence of a share price, either shadow 
or actual, have any effects significantly different from the financial incentives that lawyers and 
law firms already face?  If not, there’s an argument that making available a new source of 
capital in the form of outside investors would be beneficial on balance.  
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 The Potential Significance of Derivative/Share Price 
 
 The financial pressures that law firms currently face are well known.  The legal services 
market has become intensely competitive over the past generation, and the landscape is littered 
with the shells of firms that have not been able to survive the transition.  Revenue and profit 
information is readily available, and various ratios based on financial performance are used to 
rank firms.  Profits per equity partner (PEP) and Revenue per Lawyer (RPL), rightly or wrongly 
seem to be the two metrics that receive the most attention and most often affect behavior (as, 
of course, in Mayer Brown’s recent decision to de-equitize 10% of its equity partners).   One 
might argue that in this environment lawyers and law firms already may be prone to pursue 
their own financial self-interest at the expense of clients, or to acquiesce in client wishes 
regardless of their questionable legality.  Would the risks be any greater if there were outside 
investment in law firms?  Assuming such investment were passive, would a share price per se 
have any different effect than PEP? 
 
 I think this question is surprisingly hard to answer with any clear confidence.  Consider 
first the impact on law firm structure and culture.  What law firm characteristics are likely to be 
attractive to investors?  Well, stability for one.  The assets of law firms are mobile individuals.  
As Stephen Mayson suggests, “if the firm is perceived to be dependent on key partners who 
could leave the firm, taking relationships and client work with them, the sustainability of the 
firm’s income could be doubted and its value depressed.”  Stephen Mayson, Building 
Sustainable Value: A Capital Idea, in MANAGING THE MODERN LAW FIRM: NEW CHALLENGES, 
NEW PERSPECTIVES 141, 146 (Laura Empson ed. 2007).    
 
 Firms with high share prices would not be simply those with major rainmakers.  Rather, 
they would be those that were most successful in integrating lawyers into the firm, coordinating 
their practices, and efficiently using both legal and non-legal staff to provide services.  This 
premium on organizational integration could reduce the power of rainmakers and lessen activity 
in the lateral market.  Currently, there is no influential stakeholder whose financial stake in the 
firm encourages profitable lawyers to curb self-interest for the sake of the firm.  Those with the 
most business are the most mobile, and often the least inclined to make this compromise.  As a 
result, firms are vulnerable to becoming temporary coalitions whose stability can be threatened 
when departures reach a tipping point.  It’s possible that if derivative/share value becomes a 
critical metric, rainmakers may conclude that harmonizing their practices with the firm will be 
more profitable than seeking the best compensation package in the free agent market. 
 
 Indeed, perhaps to become even more fanciful, firms may decide that a compensation 
system weighted heavily toward “eat what you kill” is counterproductive in a world in which 
stability and commitment to the firm are key considerations for investors.  This may lead to a 
more productive balance of cooperative and competitive incentives within the firm, as well as 
simply a more pleasant and supportive atmosphere.  Less emphasis on individual lawyers as 
profit centers could reduce the opportunity costs of providing training and mentoring, and 
induce firms to invest more heavily in such activities to enhance the productivity of the overall 
organization.  It may reduce inclinations to hoard work, and encourage more cross-selling and 
referrals within the firm.  Investor preference for stability thus could temper what some see as 
excessively individualistic tendencies in modern law practice. 
 
  13  
   
 At the same time, the ultimate source of profits in a law firm, as in any professional 
services organization, would continue to be human capital.  Lawyers who use it to attract clients 
will still be essential to a firm’s financial success, and are likely to have substantial, even if 
somewhat reduced, influence.  Furthermore, if share price become the metric by which to 
evaluate law firms, lawyers will have an unequivocal standard to use in deciding whether to 
stay at or leave a firm.  Even if firms as a whole might be better off if they refrained from 
encouraging an active lateral market, any one firm may be unable to resist the temptation to 
use its share price as a lure for partners at other firms. 
 
 Nonetheless, let’s assume for the purposes of discussion that lawyers will have an 
incentive in an outside investor regime to place more importance on contributing to the 
financial success of the firm as a whole.  What would this mean for lawyers’ ability and 
willingness to serve clients faithfully, and to ensure that client conduct didn’t erode the social 
capital of the legal system?  One current lament is that firms have only limited ability to 
regulate the behavior of their lawyers, because they are keenly aware that rainmakers may 
decamp for other firms if there is any effort to encroach on their freedom of action.  Any effort 
to impose anything more than minimal ground rules may precipitate this exodus.  Firms 
therefore may hesitate to rein in profitable lawyers who are pushing the envelope -- as may 
have happened with Jenkens & Gilchrist and tax shelter partner Paul Daugerdas.   From this 
perspective, a less active lateral market would give firms leverage to enforce more robust 
standards of conduct and foster a more unified firm culture.   The lesser attraction of exit as an 
option may compensate for firms’ inability in most states to enforce even reasonable penalties 
on lawyers who leave the firm and take clients with them.  On the difficulties for firms created 
by the unenforceability of such penalties, see my Law Firms, Competition Penalties, and the 
Values of Professionalism, 13 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1 (1999), and Larry Ribstein’s Ethical Rules, 
Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure, 84 Va. L. Rev. 1707, 1730-1738 (1998). 
 
 Some, perhaps many, lawyers, however, would regard this as an unwelcome movement 
toward organizational interference with the judgment of individual lawyers.  A powerful strain of 
professionalism asserts that ethics and professional responsibility ultimately are matters of 
individual judgment.  As such, they depend on the ability of each lawyer to engage in 
deliberation without being subject to any “outside” influences.  Lawyers traditionally have been 
fiercely jealous of their autonomy, and resistant to any policies or procedures that threaten to 
reduce them to mere “employees” rather than independent professionals.  For those who see 
things from this perspective, the greater leverage that a firm might acquire over individual 
behavior as a result of outside ownership would lessen the ability of lawyers to serve clients as 
they see fit and to ensure the propriety of client conduct. 
 
 While we can’t dismiss the importance of individual character, this formulation of 
professionalism is blind to the profound impact of organizational structures on individual 
behavior.  Countless studies establish that people act differently in organizations than they do 
on their own, and that there are distinctive ethical risks that characterize the organizational 
setting.  In the bureaucratic world of the twenty-first century, ethical conduct is crucially 
dependent on organizational structure and culture.  Treating efforts to establish such structure 
and culture automatically as intrusions on ethical autonomy badly misreads the modern ethical 
landscape.  An individual lawyer subject to a strict “eat what you kill” compensation system 
arguably is at far more ethical risk than one who practices in a firm that requires lawyers to 
comply with standard procedures in matters such as client intake, engagement letters, and the 
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provision of legal opinions.  I’ve suggested how such a compensation system may play at least 
some role in contributing to ethical misconduct in my case study EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE 
FALL OF A WALL STREET LAWYER (University of Michigan Press 2004).   
 
 Furthermore, as Gilson and Mnookin observed twenty years ago, a law firm represents 
an opportunity for lawyers to share the risks of downturns in their respective practices.  Ronald 
Gilson & Robert Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry Into the 
Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 313 (1985).   Having some 
degree of protection from the full brunt of market volatility can provide the space for an 
individual lawyer to take account of non-financial considerations in the conduct of law practice.  
Such an arrangement is only possible, however, if lawyers see themselves as participants in a 
collective undertaking, rather than as contractors who use the firm solely as a platform for 
obtaining rewards based on individual profitability.   
 
 Yes, it’s possible that a firm may use its increased influence to pressure lawyers to act 
unethically.  A firm that invests in organizational capital that makes it more financially and 
culturally stable, however, seems less likely to do this than one facing financial pressures and 
cultural discontinuity caused by significant vulnerability to the lateral market.  Furthermore, for 
a long time we have simplistically overemphasized the variable of personal character on ethical 
behavior, and underestimated the influence of situational forces than can influence conduct. 
Automatically equating greater organizational influence with an intrusion on ethical autonomy is 
an expression of this myopia.  Anything that redirects our traditional narrow focus in ethics from 
the individual to the impact of organizational structures would be salutary. 
 
 Is there a risk, however, that the value of a derivative instrument or an equity share 
would quickly become the uber-metric, the single number by which law firms are evaluated?  
Many complain, of course, that this is exactly what has happened with publicly traded 
corporations, and that managers’ tendency to “manage to the share price” has had pernicious 
effects.  Indeed, the “Paulson” working group on United States capital markets has recently 
recommended that companies stop providing quarterly earnings estimates, in an effort to 
reduce the influence of share prices on managerial decisions.  Would the emergence of 
derivative/share price as the key measure of law firm performance be any worse than the 
current regime in which figures such as PEP and RPL have assumed such importance? 
 
 As Adam Smith, Esq. has highlighted, of course, Guy Beringer of Allen & Overy has 
suggested that PEP has already become “the sole measure of success,” and that this 
development is short-sighted.  Beringer argues that “[a] proper measure of success will never 
be simple and one-dimensional,” and that PEP “should be replaced with measures which take 
account of sustainable profitability, client satisfaction and staff motivation.”  Furthermore, 
Beringer maintains, PEP pays no heed to corporate responsibility; I have suggested that the 
impact of lawyers’ work on the legal system makes this an especially critical consideration in 
evaluating lawyers and law firms.  If we already are at the point where PEP has become the 
dominant metric, however, would substituting derivative/share price in its stead make much of 
a difference? 
 
 My tentative sense is that it might.  Notwithstanding the decline of belief in the Efficient 
Capital Market Hypothesis, share price has acquired almost mythical status as the virtually 
unquestioned measure of corporate performance in the eyes of investors and the public.  
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Furthermore, those who argue that the basic function of a company is shareholder wealth 
maximization dominate modern thinking on the corporation.  It is common, for instance, for 
people to assume unproblematically that shareholders “own” the corporation, even though their 
bundle of rights resembles nothing like conventional property ownership.   
 
 Even though PEP casts a large shadow, it is not without critics, and there are other 
figures that can be used to complement or even challenge it.  If law firms were to acquire 
outside investors, however, they would enter a domain in which the powerful gravitational pull 
is toward maximizing a single number by which firms are evaluated: share price.  It would be 
easy to think of investors as “owning” the firms in the same way that people tend to think of 
shareholders as “owning” a corporation.  If this occurs, there might be little space for firms to 
rely on other measures of performance, and less latitude to engage in activities – such as pro 
bono work – that did not contribute to the bottom line. 
 
 There’s also the possibility of a more nebulous symbolic, but no less significant, 
consequence of outside investment in law firms.  This is the public perception of lawyers and 
the law.  Yes, I’ve familiar with the lawyer jokes – some of them are quite funny – and I 
recognize that the public has a certain amount of skepticism about the connection between the 
legal system and justice.  If law firms were to enter the equity markets, however, the 
perception might be that a qualitatively important divide had been crossed.  Lawyers might be 
assimilated completely into the ranks of businessmen and women, and law regarded as even 
more explicitly a commodity for sale.  This puts it somewhat dramatically; the possibility is of 
course speculative and would be difficult to prove empirically.  Symbols matter, however, even 
if they’re not amenable to precise measurement. 
 
 All this is rather a long way of saying that my suspicion is that, notwithstanding a 
plausible interpretation of Rule 5.4(d)(1) that would permit issuing a derivative instrument, a 
state bar is likely to interpret the Rule to prohibit it.  I’ve suggested what I think would be the 
main objections even to passive investment by outside investors.  As I hope my analysis 
indicates, the value of your proposal is that it would require considering some basic questions 
regarding lawyers and law firms, and the answers to those questions are by no means self-
evident.   
 
 I generally side with those who regard the profession-business dichotomy as 
spectacularly unhelpful, and who argue that financial success is an important prerequisite for a 
firm’s ability to pursue broader objectives.  I’m also well aware of the traditional guild-like 
resistance of the bar to any changes that might threaten its professional prerogatives.  At the 
same time, I don’t think that we can dismiss the rhetoric of professionalism, or what Laura 
Empson calls the “professional ethos,” as wholly an expression of self-interest.  As I’ve 
suggested, despite their need to survive in a competitive legal services market, I don’t think 
that law firms should be assimilated completely into the category of just another form of 
business enterprise.  That said, the impact of a derivative instrument, or even equity ownership, 
on firms requires far closer analysis than the reflexive denunciation of money-changers in the 
temple. 
 
 Finally, it’s worth noting that the ABA’s Kutak Commission, charged with drafting new 
Model Rules to replace the Code of Professional Responsibility, originally proposed in 1981 that 
Rule 5.4 permit lawyers to practice in firms in which non-lawyers held a financial interest.  This 
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would have been conditioned on written assurance that there would be “no interference with 
the lawyer’s independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship.”   
 
 The Comment to the proposed Rule observed, “In its classical form the law firm 
consisted solely of lawyers, assisted by apprentices and scriveners.  Over the course of time the 
law firm has evolved into a variety of organizations.”  The Comment continued, “All such 
arrangements raise problems concerning the client-lawyer relationship.  Given the complex 
variety of modern legal services, it is impractical to define organizational forms that uniquely 
can guarantee compliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct.”  The proposed Rule was 
rejected by the ABA membership, which substituted the current version of Rule 5.4.  This 
history suggests, however, that there is some historical precedent for the discussion we’re 
having, and for the imminent reforms in the UK.  
 
Sale of Derivative to Non-Lawyers Within the Firm  
 
 It may be a bit anticlimactic at this point, but one issue remains, which is whether Rule 
5.4 would prohibit sale of a derivative to non-lawyer executives and employees of the firm.  If 
the underlying concern about passive investment under Rule 5.4(d)(1) is the prospect of 
lawyers “practicing to the share price,” this concern arguably would be less salient with respect 
at least to non-executive employees.  The derivative would be less a way of tapping into a 
major new source of capital, and more a means of making compensation more attractive for 
those who contribute to the success of the firm.   
 
 The absence of a large trading market also would mean that the price of the derivative 
might assume less visibility, and have less significance, than if the instrument were sold to 
outside investors.  For this reason, it might not have the kind of potential influence on law firm 
decisions that’s likely to lead state bar organizations to prohibit selling the derivative to the 
public at large.  That’s not to say that a state bar wouldn’t treat the sale of a derivative to non-
executive employees as a violation of the Rule, but there would at least be a decent argument 
the other way.  Furthermore, Rule 5.4(a)’s proscription on sharing legal fees with a nonlawyer 
would not seem to be a problem.  Even if we regard the derivative as the equivalent of sharing 
such fees, section (a)(3) of the Rule permits profit-sharing in furtherance of a compensation or 
retirement plan.   
 
 Sale of the instrument to non-lawyer executives, however, might be more of a problem.  
There would be an argument that the executives are not passive investors, but occupy positions 
of influence within the firm.   The ostensible risk is that a non-lawyer might have an incentive to 
exercise authority over lawyers that intrudes on their judgment for reasons of financial self-
interest.  This risk would seem to depend on the nature of the position that the executive 
occupies.  A person who is the head of Information Technology or the Chief Financial Officer, 
for instance, arguably isn’t in a position to exercise influence on lawyers’ professional decisions.  
A non-lawyer Chief Operating Officer, however, may be, which may make him or her ineligible 
for purchase of the derivative.  It’s possible to characterize a COO’s authority as simply not 
extending to any professional judgments that lawyers make, and therefore as posing no risk, 
but the practical realities of influence within the firm may lead regulators to find that argument 
unpersuasive. 
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Conclusion 
 
 I’ve provided a pretty lengthy answer to a simple question.  The reason is that your 
proposal forces us to consider the implicit premises of longstanding assumptions.  I’m certainly 
haven’t resolved definitively all the issues that this raises, but you’ve made me think about just 
what those issues are more clearly than I have before.  That’s an impressive accomplishment 
for a one-sentence question. 
 
 Thanks for sharing your idea with me.  I’m of course happy (in fact eager) to talk about 
all of this at greater length.   
 
 
        Best Wishes, 
 
        Mitt 
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University of Illinois College of Law 
504 East Pennsylvania Avenue  
Champaign, Illinois 61820 
April 1, 2007 
 
 
 
Dear Bruce 
  
 This is, indeed, something I'm interested in. Unfortunately I haven't had the time to 
think through anything like the elaborate answer that Mitt has come up with.  I do have two 
general thoughts.   
  
 First, while we can easily envision problems with any new organizational tool, the 
fundamental question, it seems to me, is the extent to which law firms present unique 
problems.  For example, there are agency costs inherent in any capital structure, but for firms 
generally we let the market, including the market for state law, work out those problems.  
Should law firms be different?  Of course lawyers and law firms are important to the legal 
system and society.  But we generally address firms' social costs by regulating their conduct 
rather than their internal structure.  Social responsibility theorists have urged the latter 
response, but so far their arguments have been rejected. Is there a special reason for accepting 
those arguments here? 
  
 Second, to the extent that your derivative idea might be said to cause special problems, 
to what extent can we attribute this to the need for financial arbitrage?  You've proposed 
minimal interference with existing rules.  Would we be better off -- for clients and society -- if 
we just scrapped the rules and let the market equilibrate?  
  
 Again, I don't have answers, and I don't intend this as a criticism of Mitt's response, 
which I haven't studied.  I look forward to further discussions. 
  
          Larry 
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Adam Smith, Esq. 
305 West 98th Street 
(#4C-S) 
New York, NY 10025 
April 5, 2007 
 
 
 
Prof. Milton Regan 
Georgetown University Law Center 
600 New Jersey Avenue NW 
Washington, DC  20001-2075 
Via email: regan@law.georgetown.edu 
 
Re:  Law Firms & Capital Markets Access 
 
Dear Mitt: 
 
 This is to lay out my further thoughts on this topic, as informed by and partially in 
response to your comprehensive March 31 letter to me, which was deeply thoughtful and just 
plain impressive:  Thanks. 
 
 Concerning your letter, overall my reaction is one of fundamental agreement, albeit on 
some points I believe I can offer a view either countervailing to yours or congruent, but 
extending your thoughts to arrive at a slightly modified destination.   
 
The Issue 
 
 To reiterate part of my earlier letter, here’s the situation that initially got me thinking 
about this problem:  While lawyers can and certainly do earn very handsome incomes as senior 
partners in AmLaw 100 firms, they have no material wealth-creation opportunities akin to those 
available to corporate executives, such as stock options. 
 
 This state of affairs leaves law firms at a competitive disadvantage when it comes to 
recruiting and retaining talent.  Lawyers can be lured by private equity, hedge funds, 
investment banks, management consulting, and even plain old corporate clients offering stock 
options.   Also, “C-suite” executives in law firms cannot be compensated at levels equivalent to 
their peers at similarly-sized corporations.  Last and most obvious, ordinary income receives the 
most onerous tax treatment of all forms of potential compensation. 
 
 On a more personal level, I’ve spoken with several managing partners of major firms 
who have seen their firms’ gross annual revenues double, quadruple, or more during their 
tenures, and who are understandably exasperated that they have no way of personally 
benefiting from what would be the handsome performance of the law firm’s “stock” in a way 
that any corporate CEO would as a matter of routine.   
 
 Adding insult to injury, these people also have to keep very substantial amounts of 
personal capital locked up inside the firm, often earning below-market or even zero interest. 
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My thoughts have also been informed by speculation over the past few years on what the 
coming Clementi reforms might mean in the UK. 
 
Analysis & Response 
 
Here, I won’t re-state your thoughts in your March 31 letter, but I’ll try to respond to and 
extend them where germane. 
 
 The Derivative Security Itself 
 
 Short-changed in my initial proposal was fleshing out what would lie behind valuation of 
the derivative itself.  It would reflect more than simply annual revenue or gross profits, and 
would reflect or incorporate a component relating to ongoing enterprise value—not just income, 
but an assessment of the firm’s organizational capital (systems, know-how, coordination skills) 
and reputational capital (with clients, potential competitors, law schools and judges). 
 
Also, I’d like to highlight a conceptual flaw lawyers are prone to in thinking about the financial 
returns they receive from a law firm:  They conflate the roles of owner, investor, and worker 
since, contrary to typical corporations, the same individuals occupy all three roles.  This is an 
error, which the creation of our hypothetical derivative would expose and necessarily correct.   
 
As workers, their economic value is essentially what the market would have to pay a similarly 
skilled lawyer-employee.  As investors (which many of course actually are as contributors of 
capital), they’re due a competitive return on their funds, adjusted for the risk of the enterprise.  
Finally, as owners, they would be entitled to the residual profit retained after all the factors of 
production—including themselves as producing lawyers—receives fair market remuneration. 
 
You’re right to point to Stephen Mayson, Building Sustainable Value: A Capital Idea, in 
Managing the Modern Law Firm: New Challenges, New Perspectives 141 (Laura Empson ed. 
2007), where he says (at 145) that a rational investor would value a  firm primarily based on 
“the volume of economic income and its perceived sustainability.”   Ceteris  paribus, more 
income is more valuable, but not at the expense of behaviors (such as hoarding clients, 
resisting entreaties to collaborate, refusing to contribute to unbillable “firm building” activities 
such as mentoring) which create an unstable firm.  I will suggest a bit further along that this is 
potentially one of the salient results of the derivative thought experiment. 
 
 Agency Costs 
 
 As always in discussions of organizational structure, it’s essential to address the 
challenge of how to keep an agent faithful to their principals.   
 
 I may be a poor one to consult on how to best design an organization’s incentives to 
minimize the risk of agents straying, because I’ve always believed the most potent and vital 
constraint is one’s internal ethical compass—the sense of professional integrity, responsibility, 
and duty that makes the thought of elevating self-interest over one’s client unthinkable.  The 
most rigorous compliance or organizational governance procedures imaginable won’t stop 
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anyone with larceny in their heart, and a sense of personal  honor is always a more sturdy 
guide to conduct than a disclosure checklist. 
 
 But I also believe, as you seem to, that a consistent course of lawyers’ placing their self-
interest above their clients is economically self-defeating in a competitive marketplace.  In the 
short run, there can be deviations from this—and justice delayed is irksome—but I firmly 
believe it catches up with everyone in the longer run.   
 
 Particularly to the extent having outside investors might increase a firm’s 
“transparency,” there may be at least some reason for optimism that lawyers would be less, not 
more, inclined to deviate from the highest professional standards for fear of being exposed. 
 
 Here’s where I come out:  The important question for present purposes is not whether 
there are lurking agency costs under the present system or the hypothetical system, but 
whether there’s a persuasive case to be made that there would be a material, detrimental 
increase in those  costs if we moved to the new model.  I can’t see any reason why that would 
be. 
 
 Law as Public Good 
 
 You introduce a fascinating perspective on this issue by pointing out that one of the 
“products” of lawyers’ practicing is law itself, noting that litigation establishes precedents which 
govern other parties’ future conduct; that regulatory practice establishes the parameters of 
legitimate activity; and that transactional work—to my mind the most fertile of all—produces 
“novel legal forms that can become part of the accepted repertoire of private arrangements that 
the law will honor.” 
 
 I endorse your observations wholeheartedly, and would add only this: 
 
• I believe the primary reason the Anglo-Saxon common law tradition has become the de 
facto international law of business is its malleability and extensibility:  Private 
practitioners can dream up new legal forms which, if upheld, can be relied upon as 
guides to future conduct.  Civil-code regimes simply do not contemplate or permit this 
flexibility.1 
 
• Having read “Tombstones:  A Lawyer’s Tales from the Takeover Decade” (Farrar Straus: 
1992), by Larry Lederman, a Cravath-trained lawyer who become a partner at Wachtell, 
and whom I’ve interviewed, I can report that many of the innovative tactics we take for 
granted today, such as poison pills, LBO’s, proxy fights, and “Revlon” auctions, were 
made up on the fly by practitioners in the trenches, seeking tactical advantage in the 
thick of a contested deal, who had no assurance courts would uphold them. 
 
 And you’re right to point out our increasing appreciation of the profound contribution 
that everyday citizens’ understanding of the rule of law makes to constraining self-interest and 
ordering behavior in ways policing or surveillance never could. 
 
                                           
1 See http://www.bmacewen.com/blog/archives/2006/10/98_of_the_global_100_are.html 
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 That said, I have to question why or how introducing our proposed derivatives would 
diminish lawyers’ incentives, ability, or desire to continue to contribute to the corpus of public 
law.  Actually, I would argue the contrary:  That the “output” of public law might be expected 
to increase, not decrease, in our proposed derivatives-enabled model.   
 
 Why?  More than is the case today, I believe firms would be rewarded for creating 
innovative legal forms and tactics.  To support this, I look to the experience of securities 
broker-dealers and investment banks following the deregulatory “Big Bang.”  In the case of that 
industry, two unexpected developments rapidly became apparent:  First, that this hitherto 
sleepy sector could begin to display shocking dynamism in rolling out new products and services 
for their clients.  And second, that access to capital opened a new landscape in the form of 
being able to aggressively pursue mergers, acquisitions, spin-offs, and recombination’s that 
altered the industry to an unrecognizable degree.   
 
 The second is interesting, but the first is important.   
 
 While it’s certainly the case that no one can patent or copyright a new financial 
instrument or a new legal form or tactic, it’s indisputably the case that there’s a “first mover 
advantage” phenomenon in play, such that Wachtell became the go-to firm for corporations in 
the market for poison pills, and remains so to a remarkable extent a quarter of a century later. 
 
 In sum, I can’t be certain, but I would wager the quality and quantity of “public law” 
output would benefit, not suffer, from our proposed regime. 
 
 Investor Preference for Stability 
 
 One of the most significant unintended consequences—not foreseen by me in my 
original thinking on this—might be the gravitational pull the introduction of derivatives should 
exert  towards putting a premium on firm stability over short-term profitability. 
 
Consider:  Under the current model partners have every incentive to “strip-mine the firm,” as 
one of my friends puts it, at the end of every fiscal year.  Law firms notoriously under-invest in: 
• information technology,  
• knowledge management systems,  
• long-run commitments to professional development, retention, and training, and  
• a host of other intangible firm assets which have real costs today but only 
unquantifiable benefits in the future. 
 
As I’ve written, the thought process of many senior partners is that associate mentoring is fine, 
“but I really like my summer in the south of France and a new Mercedes every other year.” 
 
 Moreover, you and a host other commentators, including Stephen Mayson, have 
commented on the fact that law firms are “people businesses.”  This makes them inherently 
fragile, as the shockingly rapid decline and implosion of some name-brand firms (Brobeck, 
Coudert Bros.) has amply demonstrated.2   
                                           
2 I won’t try to list all the firms that were rescued from eventual collapse or dissolution by 
“friendly” mergers, but their numbers are legion. 
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 The devil here is obviously the temptation for partners with portable books of business 
to decamp to another firm willing to pay them close to the capitalized value of their future 
revenue stream—which destabilizes the “losing” firm and does not in fact economically benefit 
the “winning” firm, as the value of their business is captured by the individual lawyer, not the 
firm.3 
 
 Another potential benefit of linking the overall financial remuneration of partners more 
tightly to the success of the firm in toto, in contrast to their individual portfolio of business, is 
the incentive it will provide hitherto-autonomous lawyers to hew more closely to firm 
governance standards and expectations.   
 
 In the recent collapse of Jenkins & Gilchrist, we essentially saw a large, prestigious, and 
successful firm brought down by the actions of a single rogue partner, Paul Daugerdas, and his 
hyper-aggressive tax-shelter practice.  You rightly point out, Mitt, that we now know enough 
about the behavior of individuals in organizations to be able to predict with confidence that the 
ethical tone of a firm will have a potent influence on individuals’ behavior.   
 
 If one result of introducing a derivative reflecting overall firm valuation into the overall 
compensation calculus would be to reinforce a firm-wide ethical and professional orientation, it’s 
incomprehensible to me how, precisely, permitting non-lawyers to own an interest in that 
derivative would compromise firms’ professional ethos. 
 
 The Value of the Derivative vs. PEP As The Marquee Number 
 
 You introduce a fascinating discussion of whether the value of the derivative (call it $D) 
would supersede PEP as the number of all numbers which people use as short-hand for the 
successfulness, importance, or value of a firm.   We all know the evils, intrinsic and unintended, 
of PEP as the marquee metric for law firms.  So of course, one snappy—if not cynical—response 
to the question is to ask if PEP is so bad, how could $D be worse? 
 
 But of course you’re raising a more important and subtle question, specifically whether a 
more or less explicit valuation for a law firm wouldn’t cross “a qualitatively important divide,” 
making law firms equivalent in the public’s eyes to “the ranks of businessmen and women, and 
[making] law regarded as even more explicitly a commodity for sale.”  
 
                                           
3 The economic literature which discusses this syndrome is colloquially known as “superstar 
economics,” and primarily addresses entertainment celebrities and marquee athletes, where 
financial information is readily obtainable about signing bonuses, guarantees, revenue shares, 
and so forth.  Obviously no comparable public data is available in law firm land, but the 
consistent finding of the literature in other industries is that the “superstar” tends to capture 
essentially all the incremental profit which would otherwise go to the signing franchise.   
If one believes that labor markets—at least at such elevated levels—are reasonably transparent 
and competitive, this is to be expected.  Since the market for laterals in law firms is not  so 
transparent, I subscribe to the theory that some law firms have a “comparative advantage” in 
recruiting from, and profiting from, laterals, and thus that there are consistent winners and 
losers in the lateral recruitment tournament. 
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 Since this is a thought experiment—and since the double-blind real world experiment 
can never be performed—all we can really do at this point is speculate, but I’m more sanguine 
than you.  I don’t believe this is a material risk.  Why not? 
 
• First of all, much turns on the audience who might entertain the “commodity for sale” 
view.  Let’s face facts:  Very very few Americans actually are clients of AmLaw 100 or 
200 firms, which is the universe (I think) that we’re interested in.  For the vast majority 
of our fellow citizens, therefore, this would be a non-event.  In fact, I would wager that 
if you took a poll today asking people whether law firms could be public companies, the 
majority would assume they could be. 
 
• For our target audience—clients of AmLaw firms and lawyers who work for them or 
might aspire to working for them—the characterization of what they do as a “commodity 
for sale” is simultaneously one of their worst nightmares and utterly alien to their 
perception of their own professional ethos.  
 
• Realistically, I think the “shock” of law firms’ being able to engage public investors 
would be short-lived, and the cynicism, if any, transitory and soon forgotten.  I haven’t 
heard Goldman Sachs accused of offering commodity service lately, or of being 
particularly self-serving or prone to conflicts of interest.  (Obviously, any firm can fall 
into those traps, but we already have perfectly satisfactory rules on the books punishing 
self-dealing and conflicts; we know how to deal with those infractions.) 
 
• Lastly, you mention that you “generally side with those who regard the profession-
business dichotomy as spectacularly unhelpful,” which I roundly applaud, but I might 
take it a step further than you in its implications.4 
 
 To me, the profession/business dichotomy is worse than false:  I believe that it’s only 
the well-run, stable, cash-generating businesses that can provide the robust infrastructure—and 
interesting client base—that professionals need to achieve at the highest levels.  Wachtell is 
famously successful in terms of financial performance, but what’s less well known is that their 
ratio of support staff to lawyers is 2:1 as against an industry average of 1:1—or twice as high.  
I would argue their unparalleled financial  success is what enables them to provide unmatched 
levels of support for their professionals. 
                                           
4 GE under Jack Welch was by all accounts a particularly well-run business, but I  think he 
displayed an astute ear for “professionalism” by making use of the “forced ranking” annual 
evaluation, where the bottom 10% of performers were counseled and coached but ultimately 
let go if they could not measure up.  Sounds ruthless, but he made it clear that he saw it as 
essentially humane:  The justification was to reward excellence, to enable the high-performers 
to operate in an environment with minimal “drag,” and perhaps most important of all, to give 
the bottom-10% misfits an opportunity to find a happier and more productive role to fill, since 
they were clearly not succeeding where they were—and being resigned to permitting them to 
stay was doing them no favor in the long run. 
 
 The analogy to law firms as businesses is far from exact, but I believe there’s wisdom in 
the observation that mopey, under-utilized, under-performing colleagues drain professional 
esprit de corps. 
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 Larry Ribstein’s (Brief) Comments 
 
 In his April 1 email, Larry raises two interesting points:  First, that we generally leave 
organizational and capital structure to “the market for state law,” and second that we might be 
better off not “minimally interfering with existing rules” but simply by “scrapping the rules and 
letting the market equilibrate.” 
 
 I endorse #2 enthusiastically; would that I believed it possible.  If anyone wants to 
mount a serious challenge to the ABA’s medieval guild mentality, show me where to sign  up.   
That our industry is the only one which attempts—with a transparent lack of success—to cloak 
anticompetitive injunctions with the cloth of “ethics” is as humiliating as it is depressing. 
 
 As for #1, my view follows from #2:  We do not in fact have any genuine “market for 
state law” today.  What we have is a monopolistic private cartel, the ABA, imposing its 
protectionist views on an extremely significant industry—one accounting for nearly 2% of US 
GDP.   This is a classic case of “regulatory capture,” in my view, where deference to the 
regulatory entities’ judgment is to be eschewed, not endorsed. 
 
 In any event, those are my thoughts. My question for you (both) is:  Where do we go 
with this from here?   
 
         Best regards, 
 
          
         Bruce MacEwen 
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University of Illinois College of Law 
504 East Pennsylvania Avenue 
Champaign, Illinois 61820 
April 11, 2007 
 
Dear Bruce and Mitt: 
Thanks very much for your thought-provoking letters.  What began with Bruce's fairly 
radical suggestion of law firm derivatives is evolving, at least in my mind, into something 
broader.  You may or may not want to go along for the ride, but let me at any rate try to lay 
out a map.  
We started with Bruce's question: "Could law firms, consonant with ethical rules, create 
a derivative financial instrument engineered to reflect the implicit value of the firm as if it were 
tradable as a stock?" Bruce's stated objective was to address the problem that large firm 
partners have "no material wealth-creation opportunities" comparable to executive stock plans. 
This leaves the firms vulnerable to raiding by other types of firms, adverse (ordinary income) 
tax treatment, and possible international competition growing out of the Clementi reforms. 
Mitt's response puts Bruce's suggestion into the broader framework of the incentive 
problems facing modern lawyers and law firms. Mitt wonders about the effect of Bruce's 
instrument, specifically on control by non-lawyers and possibility of working to the share price, 
on lawyers' responsibility to their clients and their public role in the creation of law, and on the 
potential commodification of law practice.  
Bruce in response elaborates on the nature and purposes of the instrument.  He notes 
some advantages:  making more transparent lawyers' separate roles as owners, investors and 
workers; allowing firms to build infrastructure and capitalize on legal innovation; and giving 
lawyers an interest in building the firm rather than their own books of business.  More to the 
point, Bruce wonders if stock price might be a better metric than PEP – or at least how it could 
be worse than the "eat what you kill" (EWYK) philosophy we observe today.   Mitt 
acknowledges some of those advantages as well. 
Mitt's and Bruce's follow-ups to Bruce's original proposal obviously move from merely 
providing better compensation for big firm lawyers to addressing the fundamental structural 
and incentive problems with big law firms. It seems to me that the basic problem is that the 
proposal, as striking as it is, is actually too modest for the problems it addresses.  The 
limitation, of course, is that the proposal is designed to arbitrage around existing rules, and as 
Mitt points out, and Bruce acknowledges, there are limits to feasible arbitrage.   
One possible answer is to think outside the box, or more precisely the rules,  particularly 
since that would seem to be where the follow-ups are leading us.  Bruce would endorse this, 
"would that I believed it possible."  For reasons discussed below, I think it is possible.  More 
importantly, it's very difficult to think about the broader issues raised by Bruce's proposal unless 
we put the underlying ethical restrictions on the table.  
We agree that it's necessary to encourage lawyers to work for the long-run interests of 
clients and society rather than the short-run interests produced by PEP and EWYK.   Lawyers 
have a powerful incentive to do whatever it takes to please the "client," which actually means 
those who are running the client. In my view (see Limited Liability of Professional Firms after 
Enron, 29 Journal of Corporation Law 427 (2004) and Ethical Rules, Agency Costs and Law Firm 
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Structure, 84 Virginia Law Review 1707 (1998)), law firms theoretically can mitigate that 
incentive.  Specifically, clients (by which I mean their residual claimants) hire law firms as a 
form of "reputational bond." The law firm then, at least theoretically, establishes internal 
structures that help ensure that the lawyers serve the clients' long-run interests in the 
enforcement of the "bond."   
It is important to keep in mind that, in order to protect its reputation, the firm has to be 
able to give its members property rights in the success of the firm as a whole rather than 
merely in their own client billings. Only such incentives can encourage the members to align 
with the firm's interest in its reputation,  rather than with the potentially short-run interests of 
the client’s managers who decide whether to hire or fire the lawyer.  A big part of the equation, 
therefore, is how firms compensate their lawyers.  Traditional profit shares could provide the 
right firm-based rather than client-based compensation – for example, by paying partners 
strictly by seniority rather.  A derivative might enhance the effect by using a market for the 
profit interest to increase the accuracy of the valuation.  It might also provide some tax 
advantages (though I'm not confident of the alchemy that turns profits into capital gains, and 
this is being questioned right now in Congress in the context of private equity compensation).   
Does the absence of such a derivative really explain why we don't observe much firm-
based compensation?  I wonder.  I've argued in my prior articles that lawyers' incentives 
depend not only on how the firm compensates the lawyer, but on the firm's ability to keep 
these compensation deals from unraveling. Ethical restrictions on non-competition agreements, 
however, are based on the idea that clients have to be able to choose and control individual 
lawyers rather than be “owned” in some sense by the firm. It's hard to bind lawyers to the firm 
as a whole when a client is dangling a better deal, particularly when the lawyers know that their 
partners will be tempted by the same deals. It's this problem that really inhibits firms from 
developing the sort of intellectual property that Bruce emphasizes.  These inventions can't be 
patented or copyrighted – the firm essentially has to rely on its contracts with its members.  If 
the contracts aren't enforceable, the firm has less incentive to develop the products.   
Even apart from this problem, the usefulness of Bruce's derivative is sharply limited by 
the restriction on non-lawyer owners.   I accept for the sake of argument that an instrument 
could be sold that gives the investors no role in control of the firm. You wouldn't necessarily 
even need a "derivative" to accomplish that.  As I've written, (Going Privlic, 
www.american.com/archive/2007/march-0307/going-privlic) this is essentially the structure of 
the recent Blackstone IPO.  But Mitt points out that this might not mollify the ethics cops.  
Moreover, the need to block control obviously would constrain flexibility and marketability.  
To make this work, I hypothesize that we need to confront the ethical restriction on 
non-lawyer ownership.  To begin with, we need to ask why we have the restriction in the first 
place.  Perhaps it once made sense when law firms really were partnerships in the classic sense 
of a community of equal owners. This organizational form arguably helps overcome information 
asymmetry between lawyer and client. See Jonathan Levin & Steven Tadelis, A Theory of 
Partnerships, http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id= 311159. Clients can't easily 
measure lawyer quality, so they rely on the firm to carefully choose its partners.  As long as 
lawyers practice in a partnership in which they share profits equally with their co-partners, they 
have an incentive to hire only the highest quality professionals, and to monitor and mentor 
them in order to maintain quality.  If they can hire workers at their market wage, they'll have 
the incentive to hire cheap workers and try to make a profit out of them by overcharging 
clients. Ethical restrictions on capital formation reflect this model of co-equal partners. But the 
model starts breaking down as soon as firms go to something other than equal sharing, 
particularly when they leverage their structures with many non-partner employees.  Restricting 
partners to skilled professionals mitigates the difficulty of monitoring them, but it does not solve 
the basic incentive problem that arises from deviations from equal sharing.  
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Now let's consider some potential advantages of allowing lawyers to practice law in 
publicly-owned firms, free from the ethical constraints on both ownership and non-competes.  
Such a firm would want to maximize overall profits, and not just profits produced by lawyers in 
the practice of law.  It would also be able to enter into contracts among the members that 
promote this goal.  This structure can produce value in a number of ways.  First, the firm could 
leverage its reputation by applying it to services that are synergistically related to law practice.  
Second, the firm could, and would have the incentive, to offer more valuable one-stop shopping 
to clients.  This not only reduces client transaction costs, but reduces lawyer-client agency costs 
by encouraging the firm's employees to recommend the services clients need – not just legal 
services, but accounting, financial and other services as well.  Third, a large multi-service 
publicly traded brand would offer clients more security. With the increasing risk of large-scale 
liability, and firms' fragility in the face of partner defections, clients don't get the protection they 
once could expect from mere size and fancy offices.  In short, a firm that fully exploited the 
value and synergies inherent in its brand would be a more valuable firm than the law-only firms 
of today.  And such a firm could offer its lawyer-employees the sort of firm-based incentives 
that can constrain the destructive tendencies of EWYK. 
What about the problem of practicing to the share price?  I've laid out my version of 
why that's not a problem in conventional corporations in Accountability and Responsibility in 
Corporate Governance, 81 Notre Dame Law Review 1431 (2006). My basic point there is that 
there is a lot of empirical and theoretical support for the notion that the current model of 
corporate managers being held basically responsive to market forces produces social 
responsibility, and that disrupting that model, as some social responsibility theorists propose, is 
likely actually to reduce social welfare.  That point is also made more concisely in Gordon 
Smith's fine recent article, The Dystopian Potential of Corporate Law, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=976742.  As you both have wondered, can 
these incentives really be worse than those produced by PEP and EWYK?   
To be sure, lawyer-employees of large firms may go astray, and may not be attentive 
enough to their important role in creating and maintaining legal institutions. I agree that that 
role is important.  See Class Action Lawyers as Lawmakers (with Kobayashi), 46 Arizona L. Rev. 
733 (2004) and Lawyers as Lawmakers:  A Theory of Lawyer Licensing, 69 Mo. L. Rev. 299 
(2004).  Indeed, I've argued that lawyers' public law-creation role is not just one, but the only, 
justification for continuing lawyer licensing. Whether or not that's true, lawyer discipline would 
survive law firm restructuring.  The question is whether the regulation ought to focus on lawyer 
behavior or law firm structure.  There is little mandatory regulation of corporate structure, yet 
corporate behavior itself is heavily regulated by federal and state law.  I suggest that this may 
be the appropriate approach to law firms as well.  I recognize that many will argue that internal 
firm incentives may push against the incentives provided by ethical rules.  But, as I argue 
above, I think that the incentives produced by publicly held firms would actually complement, 
rather than be inconsistent with, regulation.  
If you're ready to contemplate the possibility of deregulating law firm structure, then we 
reach the question of how to achieve this result. I previously alluded to state competition.  Of 
course, as Bruce noted, we don't have any such thing now.  One reason is that ethical rules are 
imposed on a territorial basis, which means that multi-jurisdictional firms may be subject to the 
law of each state in which they have a branch office. In Ethical Rules, Law Firm Structure and 
Choice of Law, 69 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1161 (2001), I suggest adopting a corporate-type choice-of-
law rule that would permit firms to choose a single regime to provide "structural" ethical rules, 
like those dealing with law firm ownership and non-competition agreements  But I understand 
that without this change the idea of competition for these rules doesn't work.  
The basic problem with all this is that it flies in the face of the guild mentality that still 
has an iron grip on the legal profession.  The fundamental question concerns what might be 
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called "lawyer exceptionalism" – are lawyers and law firms really different from the rest of 
society and our capitalist economy? If, as I argue above, working to the share price basically 
works for society in corporations generally, we have to ask why it shouldn't work for lawyers. 
It's right to think about the potential commodification of law practice.  Commodification is what 
capitalism does.  The question is whether that's something to worry about, or to welcome. 
Even if I'm right, could this happen?  I think so.  If there's money in the high-value 
publicly held law firm, there's also money in challenging and possibly breaking down the 
restrictions.  Moreover, legal business is now international, and can be captured by Clementi-
ized UK firms.  Capitalism is profoundly destructive.  Whether we like it or not, international 
competition could break down the resistance of tradition and history.  
I want to emphasize that one doesn't have to agree with all, or even any, of the above 
to accept my basic point that these issues should be on the table.  Perhaps a debate on this 
subject will come to the conclusion that these ideas are profoundly wrong and unrealistic.  But 
even if that's so, I think the debate will have been useful.  Such a debate should include not 
only lawyers and scholars of the legal profession, but also some corporate and finance people, 
even those (like Gordon Smith mentioned above) who have never even considered the 
application of their work to law firms, but whose work is illuminating on these issues.   
So, in conclusion, I think that Bruce has raised some very interesting questions.  I don't 
see how we can avoid the broader implications of those questions, so we may as well embrace 
them.   
         Sincerely, 
         Larry 
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Adam Smith, Esq. 
305 West 98th Street 
(#4C-S) 
     New York, NY 10025 
April 15, 2007 
 
Prof. Milton Regan 
Georgetown University Law Center 
 
Prof. Larry Ribstein 
University of Illinois College of Law 
 
Re:  Law Firms & Capital Market Access 
 
Dear Mitt & Larry: 
 
 First, just a personal word on how much I’m enjoying engaging with you both on this 
intellectual pursuit.  I’m pleased my initial question has led in unanticipated directions, but I 
embrace them wholeheartedly. 
 
 Just a few “final” (for this round, at least) thoughts in response to Larry’s last letter 
suggesting that “we may as well embrace” “the broader implications.” 
 
• Permit me to stipulate that I endorse going beyond my initial proposal since it’s clearly 
the case that it “is actually too modest for the problems it addresses.”   I envisioned a 
modest proposal for modest purposes, but I now do not believe the consequences of my 
original proposal can be limited:  In for a dime, in for a dollar.  More seriously, I think 
that questioning the “ethical” proscriptions against non-lawyer ownership of law firms 
opens up the entire landscape of law firm structure, lawyer incentives, and lawyer 
behavior. 
 
• Once one’s eyes are opened, as it were, to how bizarrely “exceptional” law firm 
structure and regulation are, the door is wide open to what Larry nicely characterizes as 
capitalism’s “profoundly destructive” marketplace logic.  All I would add is that 
capitalism is profoundly destructive only to the status quo and that the flipside of that 
“destruction” is the immensely more valuable innovation and creativity which 
inadvertently cause that destruction.   (The Wintel PC platform may have “destroyed” 
DEC and Wang, and imperiled IBM for a decade or so, but would we take the other side 
of that trade?) 
 
• To question the ethical proscription on non-lawyer ownership requires understanding its 
original justifications, and determining whether they are obsolete or still applicable with 
any degree of force.  I think this analytic exercise should be an agenda item of its own 
for our proposed conference.  (I know where I come out, but I suspect I’m in the 
distinct minority in our profession:  We need to air this linen very publicly.) 
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• Larry lays out three positive consequences of permitting non-lawyer ownership, creating 
what I’ll all “hybrid” firms, providing legal and non-legal services, all of which I 
thoroughly endorse and to which I would add a fourth: 
 
o First, that a hybrid firm could use its reputational capital to provide law-related 
services.  I heartily agree, and would point to the financial services industry as a 
model.  Institutions there have moved over the past century from plain old 
lending to trading for clients and then their own accounts, to securitizing 
portfolios of debt, to creating derivatives and beyond.   
 
o Second, that hybrid firms would have every incentive—nicely aligned with their 
clients’ interests, I might add—to provide the appropriate mix of legal, financial, 
accounting, tax, brokerage, and other services that best addresses the clients’ 
issues and challenges.  Today, law firms have every incentive to over-
recommend, over-sell, and over-perform legal services and legal services alone. 
 
o Third, that a firm performing an array of services would offer more stability.  This 
is surely the case, as we know from diversified portfolio theory if nothing else.  
Law firms today are inherently fragile, subject to “runs on the bank” in the form 
of partner defections.  To be sure, the intellectual capital of the Brobeck’s and 
Coudert’s of the world is not destroyed:  It migrates to Clifford Chance, 
O’Melveny, Orrick, etc., but with tremendous transactions costs to clients and the 
system in general and at great personal cost to the individuals required to 
relocate, especially those with weak or nonexistent practices of their own. 
 
o Finally, let me add that I think hybrid firms would find themselves, through 
desire or market necessity, pursuing innovation in the delivery of legal services, 
the likes of which we can only imagine.  Elsewhere I’ve speculated on whether 
the legal industry couldn’t truly take as its model financial services, which is a 
strikingly rich ecosystem of players of every size from one-man bands to some of 
the largest corporations in the world, providing a tremendous variety of products 
and services—in constantly growing numbers and broadening diversity.   
 
• Larry concludes with two ideas which I think are almost one and the same:  The 
question of “whether the regulation ought to focus on lawyer behavior or law firm 
structure.”  This is one of those questions that, once you pose it, answers itself.   
Answer A is clearly correct, and the fact that we’ve tolerated Answer B as long as we 
have speaks loudly to how blinkered our professional outlook can be. 
 
But I think getting to that result is deeply linked to his other concluding point, asking 
why law firms should not be able to choose their governing structural law ex ante rather 
than having it foisted upon them by the happenstance of geography—as corporations 
can do.  I would like to believe that single change—permitting law firms to elect their 
“home” jurisdiction for purposes of fundamental structure law—would in itself cause the 
almost inevitable cascade of everything else we’ve been discussing, through the “choice 
of law competition” Larry has studied and written about so effectively. 
 
And doesn’t this simply reflect the world we live in today?  What makes Clifford Chance 
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a UK and therefore Clementi-eligible firm, or Orrick a “California” firm when its largest 
single office is in New York? 
 
 
 As I said at the outset, this began as a remarkable intellectual journey for me and has 
only become deeper and wider in its implications.  Thank you both for pursuing this in the 
spirit of finding out where it might lead, and “embracing” that. 
 
 
          Best regards, 
 
            
         
          Bruce MacEwen 
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